Annals of Health Law
Volume 14
Issue 2 Summer 2005

Article 9

2005

New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in
Nonprofit Hospitals
Thomas L. Greaney
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas L. Greaney New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals, 14 Annals Health L. 421 (2005).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol14/iss2/9

This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Annals of Health Law by an
authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Greaney: New Governance Norms and Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals

New Governance Norms and
Quality of Care in Nonprofit Hospitals
Thomas L. Greaney*
Managers and boards of nonprofit hospitals understandably feel
themselves under siege today. The forces circling their citadel are both
numerous and heavily armed. The Internal Revenue Service, state attorneys
general and charity regulators, the plaintiff's bar, and Congress are all
poised to take actions that may profoundly affect the governance of
nonprofit institutions, especially acute care hospitals. Not only are these
forces likely to recast the formal legal duties of nonprofit fiduciaries and
alter the composition of hospital boards, but perhaps equally significant is
their potential to influence the norms that govern the conduct of managers
and directors. It seems quite likely, for example, that directors will
internalize a new conception of their responsibilities, although the
institutional response will vary considerably among nonprofit systems of
different size, sophistication, and mission.
What all this fomentation portends for quality of care is far from clear,
however. The landmark case that provides the theme of this symposium,
Darlingv. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital,' began an evolution
that energized and legitimated centralization of authority within hospitals.
For those foreseeing a need for enhanced efficiency in business practices
and decision-making by nonprofit hospitals facing the onset of competitive
health care markets, the infusion of corporate management structures
seemed both inevitable and desirable. Particularly important was the need
to better coordinate the business and clinical aspects of the hospital.
Discarding prior common law interpretations of the role of managers of
nonprofit hospitals, Darlingestablished an affirmative duty to monitor the
quality of care in their institutions. Though relying on particular licensure,
regulation, and internal bylaws to support this conclusion, the decision
strongly influenced the subsequent path of governmental and private
ordering of responsibilities.2 Moreover, in recognizing that business
* Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint
Louis University School of Law. B.A. Wesleyan University. J.D. Harvard University.
1. 211 N.E.2d253 (111. 1965).
2. John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuringof the Hospital Corporation:A Call
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considerations were ineluctably linked with clinical judgments,3 Darling
seemed to supply the impetus for uniting the parts of the so-called "three
legged stool" of nonprofit hospital governance-the board of directors, the
physician staff, and management-that has long operated to allocate
responsibilities regarding quality.
Yet, the more thorough integration of the decision-making apparatus of
hospitals has largely not come to pass, though it has been anticipated.
Professor John Blum argues that the three components of the hospital triad
remain alienated from one another and fail to achieve the coordination
necessary to promote quality assurance in hospitals.4 Contributing to the
institutional dissonance is the hospital legal structure, which he finds "has
fueled a sense of independence of the medical staff from the operation, and
fostered the concept of self-governance." 5 Others have characterized the
impact of the governance structure of the nonprofit hospital as establishing
"silos" of authority that insulate medical staffs from administration with
particularly deleterious effect in the area of monitoring quality of care. 6 Of
course, one must be careful not to attribute current deficiencies to
organizational structure or to legal incentives alone. Powerful economic
forces motivate all actors and it is impossible to separate the choice of legal
structures from the financial and economic incentives that prompt managers
to adopt them. Regardless of the strength of the causal connection between
structure and safety, the thesis that contemporary governance rules are not
well-designed to deal efficiently with the challenges presented by the
quality crisis facing hospitals today finds support in the lessons of the
patient safety movement's inauspicious progress in recent years.
This essay extends the inquiry into the disconnect between the structure
of governance in nonprofit hospitals and the goal of assuring quality by
for Change in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 10 (2004)
(following the Darling decision, "the hospital law field experienced an erosion of the
separation between administrative and clinical functions, not only through changes in
common law, but also through changes in statutory law and accreditation requirements.").
3. See Nicolas P. Terry, When The "Machine that Goes 'Ping"' Causes Harm, 46 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 37, 46 (2002) ("Darlingand the more faithful of its followers have long urged
that the business realities of health care delivery are the most potent arguments in favor of
institutional duty. Such arguments are premised on the shift in the center of gravity of health
care from individuals to institutions from the perspective of both the business relationships
and the expectations of consumers. The new reality of technologically-mediated health care
is that it can only exist at the institutional level").
4. Blum, supra note 2, at 24; see also John P. Marren et al., HospitalBoards at Risk and
the Need to Restructure the Relationship with the Medical Staff: Bylaws, Peer Review and
Related Solutions, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 207-12(2003).
5. Blum, supranote 2, at 24.
6. See Marren, supra note 4, at 207-08 (citing Dr. Martin Merry and tracing the effects
of cultural, informational and organizational insulation on quality monitoring in hospitals).
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evaluating the likely impact of the new regime of governance rules and
norms emanating from various legal and regulatory sources. It then
appraises the new paradigm's relationship to quality of care. Given the
strong consensus that managers and boards should place quality concerns at
the forefront,7 one might expect governance reform to directly address that
subject. Instead, this essay finds the new paradigm riddled with cross
currents that will impede, rather than facilitate, the promotion of quality in
nonprofit hospitals.
I. FORCES OF CHANGE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
After many years of benign neglect, regulators and courts have suddenly
begun to focus close attention on the governance of nonprofit hospitals and
their charitable missions. This newfound interest can be traced to a variety
of factors, including financial and management scandals in both the forprofit and nonprofit sectors, the increased need for charity care in the wake
of governmental cutbacks, and the changing economics of health care.
Together these factors have caused nonprofits to mimic in many respects
the emerging management models of their for-profit rivals. This section
briefly canvasses these changes and the next offers some observations about
their potential impact on the dynamics of governing the nonprofit hospital.
A. "Activism" by State Attorneys General
One of the most striking developments in the last five years has been
the heightened degree of supervision and extensive litigation by state
attorneys concerning the conduct of nonprofit health care institutions.
States have challenged a wide variety of structural transactions, including
conversions and sales by nonprofit entities, 8 shifting from acute care to outpatient services, 9 relocating or closing a hospital facility, 10 affiliating with

7. Although prestigious institutions studying quality and safety in American hospitals,
such as the Institute of Medicine, have described the current state of affairs as a public health
crisis, see infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text, hospital boards have been slow to
respond. See Barry Bader, Commentary: Quality Begins in the Boardroom, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Jan. 17, 2000, at 26 (analyzing reasons for hospital quality deficits,
concluding "the agendas of many hospitals and health system boards devote the majority of
time to economic issues and comparatively little to quality").
8. See, e.g., Health Midwest v. Kline, No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at *18 (Kan.
Dist. Ct. Feb. 6, 2003).
9. See Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 582 (Sup. Ct.
1999).
10. See id. at 577; Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 488 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1967); see generally NEW HAMPSHIRE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON OPTIMA HEALTH
(1998), availableat http://doj.nh.gov/publications/optima 1.html.
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multi-state systems, l" and joint ventures with for-profit entities or with
religious groups that require changes in services. 12 Attorneys general have
also questioned board and managerial decisions on matters of
administrative
overhead, executive compensation
and personal
expenditures, alleging conflicts of interest, self-dealing, or "waste."13 In
addition, several attorneys general have sought to block movement across
state lines of charitable assets owned by multi-hospital systems.14
Also notable about these cases is their potential to change norms and
behavior of nonprofit executives and boards, even in the absence of
definitive judicial acceptance of the states' claims. Indeed, a number of
commentators have questioned the doctrinal underpinnings of these
challenges, noting, for example, the questionable charitable trust theories
advanced to limit the board discretion and advance a heightened fiduciary
responsibility and suggesting that a certain degree of "parochialism" may
motivate attorney general activism in this area. 15 However, nonprofit
boards are notoriously risk averse and attorneys general hold considerable
leverage in their negotiations with them. In sum, directors have become
acutely aware that their decisions are being closely scrutinized by attorneys
general and other charity regulators and are therefore likely to conform to
explicit or implicit standards arising from such oversight.
B. Sarbanes-Oxley and ProposedState andFederalLegislation
Congress responded to the serious deficits in monitoring corporate
finances and governance exposed by the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and

11. See Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 245-46 (S.D. 2003).
12. See Nathan Littaauer Hosp. Ass'n v. Spitzer, 734 N.Y.S.2d 671, 673 (2001); see
generally NEW HAMPSHIRE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT ON OPTIMA HEALTH, supra note
10.
13. A notorious example was the Attorney General of Minnesota's business compliance
reviews of the Allina Health System. See Press Release, Minnesota Attorney General's
Office (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PR/
prallinamou_92401.htm (challenging Allina's expenditures of $56 million on consultants
over three-year period and questionable expenditures on executive training and perks).
14. In 2001, Banner Health System, a multi-state health care system, sold its holdings in
several states in order to concentrate its operations in and around Colorado and Arizona.
The attorneys general in New Mexico, North Dakota and South Dakota sought to block
Banner Health System from removing the proceeds of its liquidation of its assets in their
respective states. See Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen Boozang, Mission, Margin and Trust
in the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 1, 26-28

(2005).
15.

See, e.g., Greaney & Boozang, supra note 14, at 25; MICHAEL W. PEREGRINE &

JAMES R. SCHWARTZ, THE APPLICATION OF NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW TO HEALTH CARE
ORGANIZATIONS, 44-45 (2002); Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and

Paternalismin State CharityLaw Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 1017 (2004).
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other, scandals with the landmark Sarbanes-Oxley law, enacted in 2003.16
Its provisions affecting the structure of corporate decision-making and
transparency of financial and accounting matters has had important
repercussions affecting the duties of officers and boards. 17 Although the
law does not apply to nonprofit corporations, its impact on the nonprofit
sector has been considerable. For example, nonprofits are routinely advised
to comply with Sarbanes' mandate that audit committees be comprised of
independent directors and take other steps to enhance board oversight of
financial matters. 18 Also casting a shadow over directors' activities is
proposed legislation. Several attorneys general have proposed wideranging state statutes modeled closely after Sarbanes-Oxley (although
recently some have had second thoughts) 19 and several aspects of the
federal law, such as those requiring greater disclosures and transparency,
which have already been adopted in some states.2 0Finally, federal
legislation that will significantly impact governance law of nonprofits is
also under consideration.
The Senate Finance Committee has recently published a white paper and
16. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
17. Although much of the law deals with enhancing the reliability of financial reporting,
Sarbanes-Oxley contains a number of provisions that affect the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors. For example, section 301 requires that audit committee members be independent;
section 402 forbids loans to directors and executive officers; section 407 mandates rules
requiring public companies to disclose whether the audit committee is comprised of at least
one member who is a financial expert. See Lyman Johnson & Mark Sides, The SarbanesOxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1155-56, 1175, 1177
(2004).
18. See Peyton M. Sturges & Susan Carhart, Nonprofits Pressuredto Stay 'Ahead of the
Curve' on Governance, 13 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), Aug. 5, 2004, at 1149; see also Mary
Chris Jaklevic, Letting the Sunshine In: More Not-for-Profits Voluntarily Adopt New
CorporateAccountability, Board Oversight Mandates, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 24, 2003,
at 26-27.
19. See James E. Orlikoff & Mary Totten, Governance in the Spotlight: What the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Means for You, TRUSTEE, Sept. 1, 2004, at 15; Fred Scaglione, Taking
Names: Attorney General Wants Boards to Sign up for Good Governance, NEW YORK
NONPROFIT PRESS, Nov. 2003, at 1. However, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York,
recently announced he was withdrawing his proposal to apply Sarbanes-Oxley to nonprofits.
Matt Peppe, Spitzer Won't Apply Sarbanes-Oxley to Not-for-Profits, THE LEGISLATIVE
available at http://www.legislativegazette.con
22,
2004,
Nov.
GAZETTE,
read more.php?story=325 (discussing Spitzer's favoring of educating directors and officers
of nonprofit corporations, rather than imposing new laws).
20. California has recently passed a law that requires nonprofits to file reports with the
California attorney general and "requires that the nonprofit's board of directors... review
and approve the compensation of the chief executive officer and chief financial officer, to
assure that the compensation is 'just and reasonable."' Tom Gilroy, Governor Signs Bill
Requiring Charities to File Audit, Review Executive Compensation, 13 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA), Oct. 14, 2004, at 1477. However, the law largely exempts acute care hospitals from
these requirements.
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held hearings that would, among other things, federalize the fiduciary duties
of boards, limit the size of boards (to a maximum of fifteen members),
require that at least one-fifth of the board be independent, empower the IRS
to remove directors or officers, and impose various requirements regarding
audit practices.21 Perhaps seeing the handwriting on the wall, nonprofit
hospitals are unmistakably moving to conform their governance structures
to comply with much of the post-Enron law affecting for-profit
corporations.
Thus, even without sweeping legislative imprimatur,
nonprofit governance practices are following the path of their for-profit
counterparts.
C. IRS Oversight and the Evolving Meaning of "Charity"
The IRS has long served as a de facto monitor of corporate governance
in the nonprofit sector. The commands of Internal Revenue Code 501(c)(3)
that only entities "organized and operated for ... charitable [and other
enumerated] purposes" and only where "no part of [its] net earning.. .inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual ' 2 2 have provided the
basis for detailed regulatory oversight designed to assure that those
governing those institutions pay close attention to the charitable purposes of
such organizations and not permit any siphoning of their assets to private
parties. When enforcement of the latter (anti-inurement) prohibition proved
not entirely satisfactory, Congress enhanced IRS enforcement authority by
authorizing imposition of "intermediate sanctions" for certain excess benefit
transactions.
Notably, this law brings the IRS into detailed regulatory
oversight of the monitoring practices of nonprofit boards by specifying
practices that will allow them to enjoy a "rebuttable presumption of
24
reasonableness" for their reviews of interested transactions.
Moreover,
concerns about abuses have led the IRS to undertake a new enforcement
effort to examine executive compensation practices and procedures.25
Beyond the increased regulatory oversight on inurement and private
benefit, the IRS may also be moving (or perhaps is being pushed) to
21.
STAFF

STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX EXEMPT GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS:
DISCUSSION DRAFT, available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/

2004test/062204stfdis.pdf (2004).
22. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
23. I.R.C. § 4958. Though not many enforcement actions have been brought under this
act, in one important health care case, the IRS successfully sought sanctions involving an
insider conversion of a facility for less than fair market value. Caracci v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 118 T.C. 379, 379-80, 421 (2002).
24. I.R.C. § 4958; Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6.
25. See I.R.C. 2004-106; see generally Michael W. Peregrine et al., Update on Executive
"Comp": What the Regulators-And Boards-Are Focusing On, HEALTH LAWYERS NEWS,

Dec. 2004, at 26.
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exercise closer review of whether hospitals are satisfying their charitable
missions under the IRC. One of the most remarkable aspects of federal taxexempt organization law is the absence of any specific requirement of
charity care in IRS enforcement in the hospital sector. In recent years, the
IRS has closely examined and tightened the requirements for tax exemption
as a charitable organization in certain health care sectors such as HMOs and
integrated delivery organizations. Although it has since 1969 applied a
broad "community benefit" standard to test whether hospitals satisfied their
"charitable" obligations,26 some recent pronouncements suggest greater
attention to quantitative measure of supplying care to those who cannot
afford to pay.27 In 2004, the House Ways and Means Committee added
some fuel to the fire, holding hearings that, in part, questioned the wisdom
of the community benefit standard.28
D. Class Action Lawsuits
The most recent assault on nonprofit hospitals is perhaps the most highly
publicized. With over seventy lawsuits filed against hundreds of hospital
systems, the plaintiffs bar, led by renowned plaintiffs' attorney Richard
Scruggs, has charged that the hospitals' failure to provide "mutually
affordable medical care" violates a host of laws, including federal and state
tax exemption standards, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), charitable trust law, state consumer protection law,
and implied contractual obligations to uninsured patients not to bill more
than a "fair and reasonable charge., 29 The relief requested in these cases
includes injunctions requiring hospitals change their billing and collection
practices, and imposing a constructive trust on hospitals' savings from tax
exempt status, profits, and assets, so as to assure "mutually affordable
medical care."3 ° To say the least, the allegations in these cases are
26. See generally John Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption,
Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 03-13, 6-8 (Sept. 26, 2003).
27. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FIELD SERV. ADVISORY 2001-2003 (Mar. 9, 2001)
(field service advisory stating that "a hospital's mere assertion that it has a policy to provide
health care services to the indigent is not sufficient" to meet its charity care requirements
under the Code and instead "must show that it actually provided significant health care
services to the indigent").
28. Pricing Practices of Hospitals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. (2004).
29. See, e.g., Darr v. Sutter Health, No. C-04-02837, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24592, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2004); see generally Leo T. Crowley, Hospitals Prevailingin Charity
Care Lawsuits, 231 NEW YoRK L.J. 3, (col. 1)(Dec. 2004) (citing data on hospital cases as of
November 2004).
30. Lisa W. Clark et al., What May Arrive in Tomorrow's Mail?: An Analysis of Class
Action Lawsuits Concerning Hospital Billing of Uninsured Patients, 13 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA), July 29, 2004, at 1134.
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creative. 3 1 Regardless of their chances for success in litigation, these cases
have focused the attention of the regulators, legislatures, and the public on
the quantity of charity care provided and the billing and collection practices
of nonprofit hospitals.
Together with the mechanisms of explicit
government oversight previously discussed, these lawsuits have galvanized
boards and placed the quantity of charity care at the top of their agendas in
monitoring management.
II. CHANGES AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The initiatives discussed above have diverse objectives that will impose
various new obligations on nonprofit hospitals and their managers. While it
is far from certain that all will come to fruition, a reasonable
prognostication is that, collectively, they have inaugurated a revolution in
the governance of nonprofit organizations. The following section hazards a
few predictions (and some caveats) on the likely directions in which this
revolution will take the nonprofit sector.
A. StructuralChanges: Board Composition and Compensation
One important implication of Sarbanes-Oxley and the cases raising
issues of fiduciary responsibility is that boards must assume greater
responsibility for oversight of management. Correlative to this objective is
the desire for enhanced board independence and expertise. To accomplish
these goals, many predict the downsizing of nonprofit boards and, in some
cases, the possibility that remuneration will be necessary in order to attract
individuals with sufficient financial acumen. Further, boards are likely to
internalize stricter adherence to certain norms of good governance, often
labeled in the management literature as "best practices. 32 For example,
consultants and trade press advise boards (and those selecting them) to
inculcate values of independence, disclosure, and transparency.33
While many believe the impact of these changes on decision-making in
the nonprofit sector will be significant, it is impossible to predict
confidently whether it will be for good or ill. Far from clear, for example,
is the extent to which the presence of independent directors on boards
31. Legal commentators have expressed considerable skepticism about the doctrinal
bases for the claims in these cases. See Nancy J. Moore & Peyton M. Sturges, Charity Care
Litigation Sees New Filing as Defense's Theories, Strategies Evolve, 13 HEALTH L. REP.
(BNA), Sept. 16, 2004, at 1318; see also Julie Appleby, Barrage of Lawsuits 'Huge Wake
Up Call' for Non-Profit Hospitals, USA TODAY.COM, July 17, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2004-07-19-lawsuits-x.htm.
32. See Orlikoff& Totten, supra note 19, at 15-17.
33. See Jan Greene, Looking Harder: The Audit Committee Under Sarbanes-Oxley,
TRUSTEE, Jan. 11, 2005, at 12.
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improves the business performance of for-profit corporations.34 Though
outside directors may initially appear to be a sensible antidote to problems
associated with imperfect information, self-dealing by inside directors, and
agency problems in general, the case for a blanket rule commanding that
boards consist entirely or predominantly of outside directors is less than
compelling. 35 Although some studies find that director independence
correlates with firm profitability or share value, others find no relationship
or, in some cases, a negative relationship.36 Professor Bainbridge's lucid
analysis of the issue concludes that the empirical record can only be said to
demonstrate that "one size does not fit all," i.e., different firms have varying
needs for internal and external monitoring and management and other
expertise is likewise highly variable.37 Thus, although the adoption of
corporate mechanisms of oversight - including Sarbanes-Oxley reforms may at first blush seem likely to improve "efficient" (i.e., bottom line)
decision-making, such is not always the case, even in the for-profit sector.
When one turns to the question of whether increasing the proportion of
independent board members will enhance the nonprofit firms' focus on
mission, answers become even more speculative. Part of the reason for
uncertainty is that it is unclear who will be chosen to serve as independent
board members. One may see a variety of candidates serving different
constituencies: public interest advocates, community leaders, businessmen
and women with financial expertise, and physicians.38 Each group is likely
to interpret the mission somewhat differently and is likely to balance
34. The New York Stock Exchange has proposed new listing standards requiring that
independent directors comprise a majority of any listed corporation's board of directors. See
NYSE, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND

LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE

6 (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/

pdfs/corpgovreport.pdf.
35. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critiqueof the NYSE's DirectorIndependence Listing
Standards, at 13-14 (UCLA SCHOOL OF L. RES. SERIES, Working Paper No. 02-15),
availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=317121 (abstract).
36. For empirical studies which demonstrate some positive gains for shareholders
associated with increasing the proportion of outside directors, see James F. Cotter et al., Do
Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J.
FIN. ECON. 195 (1997); Bernard S. Black, The Value ofInstitutional Investor Monitoring:
The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 900 (1992). However, the record is far
from one-sided. Meta analyses of the literature suggest mixed results and that a moderate
percentage of inside directors improves performance. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black,
The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Perormance, 54 Bus.
LAW. 921 (1999); Dan R. Dalton et al., Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition,
Leadership Structure, and FinancialPerformance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269 (1998). For
a review of the literature concluding, "the empirical evidence on the merits of board
independence is mixed (at best)," see Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 17.
37. Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 23.
38. See Greaney & Boozang, supra note 14, at 33-34, 83; see generally James J.
Fishman, Improving CharitableAccountability, 62 MD. L. REv. 218 (2003).
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mission and margin using its own scale.
B. Mission and Norms
The legal developments previously described reveal that regulators and
courts will exert increased pressures to assure that nonprofits improve
delivery of charity care and fulfillment of mission objectives. The
imposition of external pressures to consider mission in all business contexts
may prove problematic for several reasons. First, it is likely that the
increased second-guessing by attorneys general will prompt boards to
closely consider the government's position - and perhaps give it excessive
deference. 39 Hence, mission-sensitive decisions made in the shadow of
government supervision may lack some of the benefits of independent
judgment and risk-taking associated with the corporate board model of
governance.
Second, the influence of newly added legal commands may have the
effect of actually impairing directors' capacity to function as trustees of the
nonprofits' missions. Social scientists have long understood what legal
scholars were slow to appreciate: social norms play an important role in
prompting individuals to act in conformance with law.4 ° In this sense, the
legal fiduciary duties that command directors to act in certain ways function
best when they reinforce social norms to behave in certain ways. 41 Yet, law
may sometimes undermine norm-induced trustworthy behavior. The
growing scholarship on the functions of "trust" in corporate agency
relationships suggests that law or regulation may also stifle boards'
willingness to fully assert responsibility to act on behalf of their
principals.42
C. Unintended Consequences
As is often the case with sweeping changes in legal doctrine, unintended
consequences may result. Several salutary aspects of the Sarbanes Oxley

39. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public?: Parochialismand Paternalismin State Charity Law
Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 949 (2004).
40. See generally Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1697, 1699 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Social Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 343-46 (1997).
41. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2001) (contending that
corporate participants cooperate with each other not just because of external constraints, but
because of internal ones and that "the behavioral phenomena of internalized trust and
trustworthiness play important roles in discouraging opportunistic behavior among corporate
participants").
42. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 584-85 (2001).
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law may have such effects. For example, empowering an independent audit
committee may create a power center within corporations that undermines
effective management or information flows. 43 Likewise, the impact of
enhanced regulatory oversight might have the effect of creating an
environment of risk aversion that is inimical to business planning and
implementation of corporate strategies. 44 Further, the proliferation of legal
authorities exercising regulatory oversight poses the risk that they will send
conflicting signals to nonprofit boards,45 perhaps creating dissonance in
decision-making.46
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNANCE PARADIGM FOR
IMPROVEMENTS IN QUALITY OF CARE

What, then, are implications of the evolving governance environment for
quality of care in nonprofit hospitals? As discussed above, corporate
liability, ushered in by Darling, held out the promise that hospitals would
be incentivized to monitor and coordinate staffs, physicians, and technology
to assure maximum patient safety. As discussed above, however, the threelegged stool has proved a wobbly platform for promoting quality. In more
dysfunctional settings, health management literature finds that physicians
and management are alienated from each other and operate at crosspurposes on issues of detection and sanctions. Where accommodative
understandings have been reached, each party contents itself to operate
within its own "silo"-physicians handling credentialing, management
overseeing risk-management. In addition, health care financing has evolved
in a manner that is less conducive to assuring vigorous quality monitoring
by hospitals than was once hoped. In the early days of managed care, it was
thought that financial incentives provided by capitation and selective
43. Richard Epstein was one of the first to suggest that Sarbanes-Oxley might generate
See Richard A. Epstein, Sarbanes Overdose Law and
management inefficiencies.
Economics, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A17; Thomas L. Greaney, Looking Beyond the
Evildoers: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of CorporateLaw, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 961, 965
(2003).
44. See There's a Backlash, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at Cl (describing mounting
criticisms of law from Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable and others that
Sarbanes-Oxley has impeded effective management and chilled mergers); see also Paul
Volcker & Arthur Levitt, Jr., In Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2004, at
A16 (responding to criticisms); Robin Buchanan & John Donahoe, Boards Will Be Frozen by
Caution'sIcy Hand, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 2003, at 11; Jackie Calmes & Deborah Solomon,
Snow Says "Balance" Is Needed in Enforcing Sarbanes-Oxley Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
2004, at Al.
45. For example, one can easily foresee settlements in class action lawsuits imposing
quantitatively and qualitatively different standards regarding charity care than may emanate
from state attorneys general or the IRS.
46. See Emsley, infra note 58, at 345 and accompanying text.
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contracting would drive hospitals and their staff physicians closer together.
The byproduct of financial integration would be to force cooperation and
spur the evolution of hierarchical organizational structures. a7 However, the
unraveling of managed care was accompanied by the disintegration of many
systems and the expected organizational evolution has not occurred.
Indeed, in today's market, one sees the threat of competition between
medical staffs and hospitals creating an adversarial atmosphere that chills
desirable physician-hospital cooperation.4 8
Despite the enormous academic interest concerning the crisis of quality
in American hospitals generated by the Institute of Medicine Report
("Report") and other studies, efforts to fix quality problems have made at
best moderate progress. Recent retrospective analyses of the effect of the
Report suggest that the technological and administrative infrastructure
necessary to correct the quality problems in acute care hospitals has not
developed. 49 Those decrying the lack of progress often note that
47.

See generally JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE (1999).

48. For example, the growth of physician owned single specialty hospitals, ambulatory
surgery centers, and diagnostic facilities has caused increased friction among many hospital
staffs. See generally, John K. Iglehart, The Emergence of Physician-Owned Specialty
Hospitals, 352 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1, 78-80 (2005). In one notorious case involving
Community Hospital of San Buenaventura, the hospital administration attempted to limit its
medical staff's self governance powers in response to its doctors having acquired an
ownership interest in a competing facility. See Medical Staff of Cmty. Mem'l Hosp. of San
Buenaventura v. Cmty. Mem'l Hosp. of San Buenaventura, No. CIV 219107 (Cal. Super. Ct.
2004); Tom Gilroy & Susan Webster, Governor Signs Bill Spelling Out Medical Staff SelfGovernance Rights, 13 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), Sept. 30, 2004, at 1397 (discussing terms of
the settlement agreement between the hospital and the medical staff including: the addition
of a conflict of interest policy in medical staff bylaws; specifications for the handling of
medical staff finances; direction for how the hospital has to consult with the medical staff in
exclusive contracting matters; and a process for allowing the hospital to request amendments
to the medical staff bylaws). This episode spurred the passage of a new law, S.B. 1325,
which establishes medical staffs in California as entities independent of the hospital with
rights of self-governance and the right to sue in their own names. S.B. 1325, Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04//bill/sen/sb13011350/sb 1325 bill 20040922 chaptered.pdf (preserving the hospital governing board as the
final autihority, and stating that hospitals and medical staffs are jointly responsible for
providing quality medical care and that the board must not take unilateral action unless it has
"a reasonable and good faith belief that the medical staff has failed to fulfill a substantive
duty or responsibility in matters pertaining to the quality of patient care"). Hospitals have
responded to various forms of competition from doctors by limiting or denying staff
privileges - a phenomenon sometimes referred to as "economic credentialing."
See
Elizabeth A. Weeks, The New Economic Credentialing: Protecting Hospitals from
Competition by Medical Staff Members, 36 J. HEALTH L. 247, 247-49 (2003).
49. Lucian Leape &Robert Wachter, leading experts on quality and co-authors of the
Institute of Medicine's (IOM) "To Err is Human" report, recently concluded that little
progress has been realized in the wake of the Report. See Donna Young, Five Years After
IOM Report, Experts Gauge Progress on Patient Safety, ASHP NEWS, Jan. 1, 2005,
available at http://www.ashp.org/news/ShowArticle.cfm?id=9014; see also, Todd Zwillich,
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coordination and systems approaches to dealing with medical error are still
lacking. 50
An important question raised by Professor Blum and others is whether
the legal standards affecting governance structures need to be reconsidered
in order to promote more effective coordination and closer attention to
quality of care. 5 How much responsibility for quality of care deficits one
can ascribe to law and regulation affecting hospital governance is a matter
of speculation. Nevertheless, a salient question is whether the 'new' model
of nonprofit governance discussed in this article will serve to make
management more attuned to quality concerns. This is doubtful, for the
reasons elaborated below.
First, the thrust of the new nonprofit governance paradigm is directed at
remedying problems other than those associated with quality of care. The
central themes of the new model focus on the following issues, none of
which explicitly or implicitly address quality of care: the quantity of charity
care, financial accountability, mission focus, board independence and
diligence, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and other breaches of fiduciary
duty. Further, there has been an almost knee-jerk reaction among
policymakers and consultants who assume the Sarbanes-Oxley-style
reforms are necessary for the nonprofit sector despite the absence of
compelling evidence of systemic financial irregularities or self-interested
behavior. To the extent that scarce managerial (and real) capital will be
spent on reform, it is likely to follow the path recommended by legal
mandates and consultants' interpretations thereof. With no obvious linkage
between the various corrective measures and enhanced attention to quality
of care, one can expect that board agendas are unlikely to reverse the
historic pattern of placing quality behind economic issues in setting the
agenda for management."
Second, some of these new developments may work against focusing
greater attention on quality of care. The key to understanding the
Little ProgressSeen in Patient Safety Measures, Reuters Health Information 2004, available
at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/49327_print.
50. See Young, supra note 49; see also Drew Altman et al., Improving Patient SafetyFive Years After the JOMReport, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 20 (2004).
51. Professor Blum's suggestions range from contractual adjustments to internal balance
of power to statutory overhaul of the physician-hospital relationships. See Blum, supra note
2, at 28-30 (proposing a menu of possible solutions: redrafting hospital and staff bylaws to
more clearly specify the respective roles of the parties; creation of a total quality committee
that would serve as a bridge between the board and the medical staff executive committee;
establishing a slotted board with designated positions for those with experts in law, medicine
and business; ending the special self-governing status of the medical staff; recasting the nonemployee physician as an agent of the hospital; and giving the medical staff control of the
board and hence hospital operations).
52. See Bader, supra note 7.
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impediments to quality improvement is found in the economics of health
financing and delivery. Business commentators refer to the underlying
dilemma as a lack of a "business case" for quality improvement," i.e.,
payment systems rarely pay for quality improvement and employers rarely
demand it. Moreover, it is often the case that neither provider can recapture
investments in quality because benefits are too remote in time and
beneficiaries are unable to perceive quality benefits. 54 The costs of
elements key to improving quality--especially enhanced information
collection, storage and retrieval capabilities--can be daunting. It should
also be remembered that some quality problems are associated with overuse
(as distinguished from underuse and misuse) of services; in these
circumstances, improving quality may reduce hospital revenues. With the
thrust of many of the changes heralded by the new nonprofit governance
paradigm to shift board attention to the bottom line and to the performance
of mission objectives, it is likely that costly quality improvements will be
placed on the back burner. As long as quality enhancement remains a
dubious business proposition, the tendency of nonprofits to import forprofit corporation governance structures and to mimic their focus on margin
will likely undermine reforms directed at enhancing patient safety.
Finally, the insistence on greater attention to mission may, paradoxically,
interfere with quality enhancement efforts. In particular, implementation of
quantitative standards for charity care has the potential to work at crosspurposes with efforts to improve quality. Fixing minimal levels of free care
might pressure providers to cut some corners in order to maximize the
quantity of charity care supplied. Lessons from the mandate of EMTALA
suggest that unfunded obligations to provide charity care may cause some
hospitals to scrimp on the quality of services they provide.5 5 Furthermore,
53. Molly Joel Coye, No Toyotas in Health Care: Why Medical Care Has Not Evolved
to Meet Patients' Needs, 20 HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 44, 45; Sheila Leatherman et
a]., The Business Casefor Quality: Case Studies and an Analysis, 22 HEALTH AFF., Mar.Apr. 2003, at 17, 18.
54. The nascent "pay for performance" movement may portend the beginning of change
in this regard, but it is far from established and faces its own internal contradictions. See
generally Jim Bellows & Michael P. Sullivan, Background Paper: Could a Quality Index
Help Us Navigate the Chasm (Apr. 2004), available at http://www.kpihp.org/areas/
Quality/background%20final.pdf.
55. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Hospital Emergency Departments: Crowded
Conditions Vary Among Hospitals and Communities, Pub. No. GAO-03-460 (Mar., 14
2003)(describing effects of crowding and boarding in emergency rooms); W. Wesley Fields,
Emergency Care in California: Robust Capacity or Busted Access?, HEALTH AFF. WEB
EXCLUSIVES, Mar. 24, 2004, at W4-143 ("Since the implementation of mandated nurse
staffing ratios in January 2004, despite an undersupply of trained personnel, crowding and
boarding pose a greater threat to the safety of Californians seeking emergency care."); see
also Bruce Siegel, The Emergency Department: Rethinking the Safety Netfor the Safety Net,
HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVES, Mar. 24, 2004, at W4-146.
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even where managers and boards desire to improve quality of care, they
face significant tradeoffs against other fiduciary and mission objectives.56
One problem results from nonprofits having broad mission objectives but
lacking clear strategies to prioritize their goals and implement their plans. 57
In addition, imperfect information, bounded rationality and other behavioral
impediments to effective reasoning under uncertainty make such decisions
unpredictable at best. 58 Research on managerial decision-making indicates
that a multiplicity of goals tends to cause performance to deteriorate and
increases the risks of sub-optimal decisions.5 9 Where goals are given equal
or unspecified weights, the attendant uncertainty also impairs effective
decision-making and job performance.6 °
IV. CONCLUSION

Powerful changes are afoot affecting governance in nonprofit hospitals.
In broad brush, they point toward structures that emulate those recently
adopted by their for-profit counterparts. Likewise, they embrace similar
objective functions for management of the "business side" of hospitals:
increased emphasis on the bottom line, accountability, and transparency. At
the same time, class action lawsuits and regulatory oversight have focused a
spotlight on charity care. When these important changes are evaluated
against the many pre-existing obstacles to dealing with the quality of care
crisis in American hospitals, the patient safety movement may find little
reason for optimism. Increased focus on financial accountability and
charitable mission may work to divert managerial attention and resources
from quality enhancement. Moreover, dealing with quality of care issues
poses special problems in the nonprofit context. The economics of dealing
with physicians (who supply both input and customers to hospitals) and the
effects of a highly competitive marketplace constrain managers' abilities to
enhance quality while simultaneously preserving both mission and margin.
56. See Kersti Krug & Charles B. Weinberg, Mission, Money and Merit: Strategic
Decision Making by Nonprofit Managers, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 325 (Spring
2004) (offering a three-dimensional model for managers to evaluate conflicting mission and
program objectives); see Ellen Goodman, Making the Best Decisions, 33 HEALTHCARE
FORUM J. 1 (1990) (describing approaches for hospitals evaluating multiple strategic and
mission factors in making capital resource allocations).
57. See V. Kasturi Rangan, Lofty Missions, Down-to-EarthPlans, HARV. Bus. REV. 112
(March, 2004).
58. See generally JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (2001).
59. See David Emsley, Multiple Goals and Managers' Job-Related Performance, 18 J.
MANAGERIAL PSYCHOL. 345 (2003); M.C. Kernan & R.G. Lord, Effects of Valance,
Expectancies, and Goal-Performance Discrepancies in Single and Multiple Goal
Environments, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194 (1990).
60. Emsley, supra note 59, at 348.
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Further affecting discretion is the conundrum of balancing
incommensurable commands of regulators and patrons (donors, community
leaders, and sponsors). In an era of evaporating public monies for charity
care, all this portends a daunting task for hospital management.
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